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Abstract: This paper provides an epistemic reformulation of quantum mechanics (QM)
in terms of inference consistency requirements of objective Bayesianism, which include the
principle of maximum entropy under physical constraints. Physical constraints themselves
are understood in terms of consistency requirements. The by-product of this approach
is that QM must additionally be understood as providing the theory of theories. Strong
complementarity - that diﬀerent observers may live in separate Hilbert spaces - follows
as a consequence. The ﬁrewall paradox, analyzed by a parallel with Hardy's paradox, is
used as an example supporting necessity of the reformulation and its consequential results.
Other clues pointing to this reformulation are analyzed. The reformulation, with the addi-
tion of novel transition probability arithmetic, eliminates basis ambiguity and the collapse
postulate, thereby eliminating subjectivity of measurements from quantum mechanics, and
resolving the measurement problem completely.
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1 Introduction
Hamiltonian formalism and Schrödinger picture of quantummechanics are assumed through-
out the writing, with time t ∈ R. Whenever the word entropy is mentioned without addi-
tional qualiﬁcation, it refers to von Neumann entropy. |x〉 becomes an outcome vector in
some given basis if it is a basis vector.
Section 2 and 3 are there to establish the need for the theory of theories - that is, the
law of which theory (Hamiltonian) to use for an observer at each time. Along the way,
the collapse postulate, requiring subjectivity of measurements, is shown to be problem-
atic in the ﬁrewall paradox context. Analysis is done through a parallel (two incompatible
descriptions) between the ﬁrewall paradox and Hardy's paradox. Because of this paral-
lel, a consistent theory of theories satisfactorily resolves the basis ambiguity part of the
measurement problem.
A basis is considered always ﬁxed in the reformulation of quantum mechanics. Thus
basis transformation is disallowed - if there is to be basis transformation, it is absorbed by
transforming a theory instead.
Once this is established, consistency requirements of Bayesian inference are transported
to quantum mechanics in section 4, now viewed as an inference framework. The theory of
theories complements on traditional postulates of quantum mechanics minus the collpase
postulate by the principle of maximum entropy and invariance of Z, cast in terms of renor-
malization. The epistemological problem of quantum mechanics is that we do not know
state vector evolution but have laws of how state vector must evolve, with free parameter
being a Hamiltonian that is conserved across time. Despite imposed conservation of Hamil-
tonian, a learned Hamiltonian may be diﬀerent over time. After all, if learned Hamiltonians
are forced to be invariant over time, then the principle of maximum entropy is not opera-
tional, and requirement of the theory of theories, established in section 2 and 3, would not
be met.
Technically, this writing can be read from section 4 section, as far as one accepts that
quantum mechanics is just a Bayesian inference framework. The idea of the theory of
theories naturally rises out of physical constraints and the principle of maximum entropy,
viewed just as a consistency requirement.
In section 5, how spacetime arises from entanglement is reviewed, also hinting toward
analysis established in section 4. An important inspiration is that in AdS/CFT, bulk works
as quantum error correction for variations in boundary states. This suggests that despite
strong complementarity, observers share eﬀectively same description, up to some deviations
in descriptions. When error correction is impossible, there goes a black hole. This responds
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to a potential criticism of strong complementarity. It will be shown that entanglement
equilibrium literature provides a direct connection to the principle of maximum entropy as
well.
A foundation for thermodynamics and fundamental irreversibility is reviewed in section
6, and is found deﬁcient, still conﬂicting somewhat with reversibility in quantum mechanics,
despite uses of thermodynamics still proven to be sound. How the theory of theories ﬁxes
this deﬁciency is explored. Frauchinger-Renner thought experiment[1] is mentioned as an
example necessitating irreversibility of nature.
Section 8 provides a complete resolution of the measurement completely and thereby
completing the fully objective formulation of quantum mechanics without the collapse pos-
tulate. This is done by providing a transition probability arithmetic from one outcome at
some time t to an outcome at another time t+ dt. The arithmetic couples Born's rule with
quantum decoherence understanding of measurements.
Additional potential concerns to the theory of theories and strong complementarity are
addressed in section 7.
That is, reformulation of quantum mechanics from Bayesian inference requirements
without the collapse postulate and subjectivity of measurements would be done in this
writing. The by-product of this approach is the theory of theories - or the principle of max-
imum entropy - which is the center of focus. Subsection 4.6 presented the completed refor-
mulation, along with further discussion as regards to deriving Born's rule and Schrödinger
equation from inference requirements in subsection 4.10.
2 Traditional weak (black hole) complementarity
The key point of some traditional variants of black hole complementarity is that even if
Alice and Bob have two seemingly diﬀerent descriptions of the world, they are not actually
inconsistent. In fact, two descriptions are diﬀerent only in disguise - they are equivalent by
some mapping. This resolves black hole information paradox automatically.
Except things are not that easy. This is because we expect that semiclassical eﬀective
ﬁeld theory is valid around event horizon of a black hole, and that an observer entering a
black hole would see nothing special at event horizon. Thus, one has to check whether our
eﬀective descriptions would be consistent. A simpliﬁed veriﬁcation mechanism by a qubit
model is whether an observer can notice a quantum cloning of a same qubit by exploiting
on two diﬀerent descriptions - if so, two descriptions are inequivalent - contradiction.
This is what many thought experiments on black hole complementarity set out to do,
the AMPS thought experiment[2] belonging to this category.
2.1 The ﬁrewall paradox
An exposition of the ﬁrewall paradox is given in Bousso (2013)[3], which will be used as a
reference of the paradox for the rest of the writing. The word theory in Bousso (2013)
would translate to description in this writing.
The key issue, to quote Bousso, is that both Alice (infalling observer) and Bob (distant
observer away from a black hole) can stay outside a black hole until key point of time to
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measure one set of entanglement. But right before Alice jumps in, the causal diamond of
Alice contains all of late Hawking radiations. Also, Alice can picture herself measuring
interior modes later, which establish another incompatible set of entanglement. That is,
Alice can see two incompatible entanglements existing in her causal diamond.
The key argument of course is that Alice has to agree with Bob's description even if
Alice did not observe all of what Bob can see. That interpolation of what Bob is about to
see is not the center of the controversy - the central controversy is on whether unmeasured
outcomes in quantum mechanics really have meaning.
2.2 Why not go for very strong complementarity?
Before exploring a parallel between Hardy's paradox and the ﬁrewall paradox, it is wise
to explore why a very strong notion of complementarity is not widely accepted. It may
be argued that because Alice did not actually see all late Hawking radiations, she is saved
from contradictions.
However, complementarity that is this strong causes a problem of what probability in
quantum mechanics really stands for. Suppose there are two paths - one path has Alice
never measuring object O and the other path has Alice measuring some object O. In case
only measurements have results - then probability of an unmeasured outcome does not even
make sense. This seems to require a heavy modiﬁcation of quantum mechanics.
The idea of causal diamond complementarity[4][3] is free of the aforementioned trouble.
The idea is that as long as O is in the causal diamond of Alice, it makes sense to talk of Alice
not measuring O and discuss probability of such a (non-)event. Thus, complementarity is
simultaneously tamed and embraced by restricting applications of quantum mechanics to
a causal diamond of an observer. But we have seen that the ﬁrewall paradox presents a
problem for causal diamond complementarity.
So if one does not like alternatives given for black hole complementarity - for example,
one may hesitate to adopt the state-dependence idea[5][6][7] because of counter-arguments
such as Harlow (2014)[8] and Marolf-Polchinski (2016)[9] - what should one search for?
(However, this rejection is only for motivations - eventually, we will see ideas inside the
alternative coming back, and thus there actually is no rejection.)
2.3 A parallel between Hardy's paradox and the ﬁrewall paradox
In examples like Hardy's paradox, the lesson of unmeasured outcomes have no result is
often given. How far can this be applied against the Harlow-Bousso argument for initial
validity of the ﬁrewall paradox? But to do that, we need to establish common aspects of
two paradoxes.
Despite the setting of a black hole creating an illusion of more complexity, the core
problem is the same. Hardy's paradox demonstrates that two descriptions of the same
system, related by basis transformation, can never simultaneously hold for an observer.
This is the lesson we want for the ﬁrewall paradox as well. In fact, the connection hints
that possible descriptions in the ﬁrewall paradox be related by basis transformation. The
diﬀerence between Hardy's paradox and the ﬁrewall paradox is that in former, observers
have access to only one description at each time. In the ﬁrewall paradox, while an individual
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observer still has access to only one description at each time, observers do have simultaneous
access to multiple descriptions. Thus, if faithfully implementing the connection, one can
say that the ﬁrewall paradox is Hardy's paradox generalized.
There is one problem to establishing the connection - quantum mechanics is silent
about which basis would be selected for observations. Thus, if we port Hardy's paradox
to the ﬁrewall paradox, subjectivist interpretations of quantum mechanics require both
descriptions of a black hole to be available for an observer inside or outside a black hole.
But the question of why a particular black hole description must be used for an observer
is indeed a valid one. Thus, the aforementioned problem does not serve as a good reason
to reject the connection.
The above consideration suggest that if quantum mechanics is complete, then it would
very likely have to be objectively so - disallowing freedom of observers. (The objective-
subjective question is independent of whether quantum mechanics is epistemic or ontic.)
This requires a rule on how a basis is chosen for an observer, which eventually will be
elevated to a need for a theory of theories.
The objective completeness also requires ﬁlling in details of transition probability of
outcomes in one diﬀerent description at t = ∆t from some measured outcome in another
description at t = 0. This question will be deferred until section 8.
2.4 From the basis selection issue to the theory of theories
The aforementioned consideration suggests that one needs to provide a theory of descrip-
tions - how one description/basis is chosen for an observer at each point of its dynamics.
But any unitary basis change U from description D1 to D2 at time t can be transformed
into e−iV t = Ue−iHt, by which one instead transforms Hamiltonian H originally shared by
D1 and D2 into Hamiltonian V for description D2, assuming that D1 and D2 shared the
same basis at time t = 0, with invariance of Hamiltonian assumed for each description.
Why even transform a basis change into a theory change? A basis naturally should
not have any physical interpretation. It is just a device that one uses to map physical
outcomes to mathematical forms. If a basis selection issue is so fundamental, why not deal
it properly in a theory? Adding a theory of theories is much better than a theory of basis
selection. This leads to strong complementarity - diﬀerent observers may even face
diﬀerent Hilbert spaces, and even an individual observer is attached with a series of Hilbert
spaces, instead of just one Hilbert space. The latter aspect of strong complementarity can
also be mapped to a requirement that an observer must be allowed to be given diﬀerent
bases over time for measurements. (It is implausible to think that an observer would
measure some subsystem in position basis - over time, it may be measured in momentum
basis, and then later position basis and so on.) Again, it is worth emphasizing that the
diﬀerent-bases analogy is only an analogy from now on, as a basis is now assumed to be
ﬁxed - the concept of diﬀerent bases is eliminated.
But an important criticism may remain: that the basis selection issue is already resolved
by quantum decoherence literature. I will argue that this is not the case. In fact, this is not
unacknowledged by quantum decoherence literature - see Zurek (2009)[10], where despite
progress in understanding the measurement problem, a complete resolution is not yet there.
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Quantum Darwinism would be considered part of quantum decoherence literature for rest
of the paper.
3 Quantum decoherence literature does not resolve the basis selection
issue
The argument is quite simple. If one adds nothing to traditional postulates of quantum
mechanics, it is silent about which basis must be chosen. Then how does quantum deco-
herence literature can talk of some pointer basis being chosen for measurements out of
quantum mechanics? It involves at least one of the below list:
• Subjectivist elements. An observer has some conscious controls over what measure-
ments to be performed. Some basis or observables may be better for an observer to
learn about some system.
• An implicit additional law added to quantum mechanics so that basis selection can
be done.
• Quantum decoherence literature does not intend to resolve the basis selection issue - it
shows how one can represent emergence of measurements in our classical measurement,
but it does not show how that emergence is forced.
If the last of the list is the case, then no further discussion is needed. The ﬁrst option will
be rejected because of the discussions above. Thus, let me focus on the second option.
The problem would not be that an additional law is given - rather, it is that the law
is not explicitly spelled out. Recognizing that one is providing a new law in addition to
traditional postulates of quantum mechanics (in replacement for the collapse postulate),
the question shifts to whether a particular law would be justiﬁed.
The main huddle in implicitly proposed laws - for example, choosing a basis that brings
reduced density matrix closest to being diagonal[11] or one that requires least amount
of access of environment for measurements[10] - is that subsystems may have diﬀerent
privileged bases. But clumping together diﬀerent basis descriptions is not possible because
of results in Hardy's paradox.
Thus a cleaner law is proposed: a theory that maximizes entropy of an observer under
constraints is used. A theory of theories is proposed instead of basis selection, because a
basis is now assumed to be ﬁxed.
4 Quantum mechanics as an inference framework
Despite quantum mechanics assumed to be an objective framework, it is still open to both
epistemic and ontic interpretations. Reasonably, one may expect that whether quantum
mechanics is epistemic or ontic really is matter of semantics - they are equivalent as far as
actual physics goes, with one interpretation making explanations simpler in some contexts.
With this equivalence assumption in mind, I will take the epistemic view of quantum
mechanics for rest of the writing.
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A state vector in simultaneously objective and epistemic interpretations describes
knowledge an observer has. This state vector may not be something actually existing,
but the state of knowledge that an observer has about the world is objectively determined
and real, encoded as a state vector.
4.1 Deﬁning an observer subsystem: observer identiﬁcation problem
Because a basis is assumed to be ﬁxed - thus there is only one basis used - and we are
manipulating on theories, it is no longer true that entropy of a subsystem is invariant. A
subsystem is deﬁned in terms of the sole basis, and that is all one needs for deﬁning a
subsystem. This point would have been obvious, but stated just in case there is confusion.
Thus, maximizing entropy of an observer would make sense.
The real problem is how we may epistemically ﬁgure out diﬀerent subsystems. That is,
what would count as an observer? If theories selected by an observer diﬀer from another,
and we want quantum mechanics to be objective, we would wish to be able to deﬁne what
would be considered an observer subsystem.
That problem is diﬃcult to answer. We can provide observer information directly, but
while this works for matters of calculation, it is unsatisfactory. One optimal possibility is
that at asymptotic past inﬁnity, every observer could be said to choose a theory such that
its shared Hilbert space is factorized to Hilbert spaces of observers as their tensor product.
This allows for clean identiﬁcation of observers.
4.2 Bayesian inference: why maximize entropy of an observer under con-
straints?
In Bayesian inference, a prior is often chosen by the principle of maximum entropy, incor-
porating constraints or information an observer has. The simple justiﬁcation of the prin-
ciple usually given is the Wallis derivation given by Edwin Thompson Jaynes. However,
more recent approaches, starting from Shore-Johnson (1980)[12] simply cast the principle
of maximum entropy as rising out of consistency requirements[13] - that is, consistency of
statistical inference requires the principle[14]. There is indeed the question of functional
form of entropy - but von Neumann entropy as a functional form of entropy is safe.
Now onto why entropy of an observer in particular instead of others. The point is that
an observer Alice only sees an external world by noticing variation of herself. Combine these
two points, and we get the principle of maximum entropy of an observer under constraints.
A remaining question then would be what constraints are. We can immediately list
one of them:
Schrödinger equation under conserved Hamiltonian
But an optimization problem, cast in terms of control and state vector, points to us that
one more constraint is required. To avoid going into details until later in the writing, let
me give an example of economics: optimization problems in economics provide a law for
state vector evolution and a separate budget constraint to provide a unique solution. It is
this budget constraint part that would need to be added.
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4.3 Invariance of partition function Z
And invariance of partition function Z, which is actually constant for the purpose here, is
this budget constraint. Z, in statistical mechanics is deﬁned as:
Z = tr
[
e−βH
]
where tr is trace, β = 1/(kBT ), with kB Boltzmann constant and T being temperature.
In quantum ﬁeld theory, Z is a normalization constant, but for correct comparisons
and predictions, one does need to keep it constant. In terms of Euclidean ﬁeld theory by
Wick rotation (or almost equivalently statistical mechanics), Z takes a role of unitarity
requirement - just that the constant sum of probability no longer is 1.
Eﬀectively, we have formulated quantum mechanics of time in C with two probability
normalization requirements. But this would not matter for rest of the writing - and time
will be kept in R.
Also, the principle of maximum entropy of an observer already places quantum mechan-
ics in fully thermodynamic settings, as the second law of thermodynamics is now satisﬁed.
Thus it would be better to take the parallel of quantum mechanics with statistical mechanics
very seriously.
4.4 Renormalization
One important clue toward aforementioned analysis is renormalization in statistical mechan-
ics. Simpliﬁed, it is about keeping basic properties of a system invariant, while sacriﬁcing
on some other properties. In terms of neural networks, it is about compressing data such
that relevant information can be extracted readily. In renormalization, by deﬁnition, Z is
supposed to be kept constant.
Renormalization possesses several ideal characteristics that we may wish to transport
to our analysis:
• Renormalization group (RG) ﬂow is irreversible. Nature over time seems irreversible.
• A scale parameter is in R. Time in our Hamiltonian formalism is in R
• Initial and end ﬁxed points of RG ﬂow can be considered. We want diﬀerent observers
to share same learning outcomes asymptotically - something like S-matrix though
not necessarily in terms of scattering, especially in that out-states are not to be
asymptotically free particle states. This is especially preferable given the observer
identiﬁcation problem.
Thus, we may say that observers learn of nature by doing renormalization with the principle
of maximum entropy and Schrödinger equation.
In renormalization, it is usually understood that (entanglement) entropy decreases in
direction of RG ﬂow, as renormalization takes out UV degrees of freedom. But what
one wants here is the opposite - increase of entropy. Reconciling this would be easy - we
think of RG ﬂow as going from IR to UV. This is actually a wrong description - it rather
reﬂects underlying duality of nature where what is IR (UV) in one description is UV (IR)
in another description. Thus RG ﬂow would still fundamentally ﬂow from UV to IR.
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4.5 Objective physics of an observer: why the principle of maximum entropy
is still valid
A counter-argument may be made against the principle of maximum entropy: since an
observer is obtaining measurements, it seems unreasonable to impose the principle of max-
imum entropy directly to a state vector without updating for measurements.
The argument itself is invalid, because post-measurement, one can always reset the
entire inference process and change initial conditions - for details, see subsection 4.6. It is
just as collapse in subjectivist interpretations of quantum mechanics resets state evolution.
However, one can go deeper, even though the above is enough for most practical uses.
Another issue in the straw-man argument is that it assumes an eﬀectively omniscient ob-
server. We do have to think of whether observers actually can keep records of their mea-
surements and whether they accidentally receive information without active measurements.
This requires inference in terms of a state vector of the entire system. However, quantum
decoherence, with the basis selection issue resolved, provides why one may eﬀectively reset
inference process by setting initial conditions with a measurement outcome.
Another way to think of the straw-man argument is in terms of recoherence. Even
decoherence, which allows for illusion of collapse, has limits - while they hold reasonably
under our largely macroscopic environments, unitary evolution in many other circumstances
create recoherence after decoherence. Thus, an observer should not always be assumed
eﬀectively omniscient.
Of course the argument presupposes rejection of subjectivist interpreations of quantum
mechanics, and if one is, at this point, not already convinced of necessity of the rejection,
there is nothing more that can be done.
4.6 Optimization problem formulation of the theory of theories
We are now in the position to complete the reformulation of quantum mechanics and thus
the theory of theories. Rest of the writing would be on studying clues pointing toward this
reformulation and analyzing its details.
Optimization problem
For subsystem A, entropy SA,t = tr [ρA,t log ρA,t] of A, where tr represents trace,
ρA represents reduced density matrix of A, is maximized at time t subject to
initial conditions, law of state vector evolution and the budget constraint.
Initial conditions: initial state vector |Ψt0〉 at t = t0, partition function constant
Z.
Law of state vector evolution: |Ψt〉 = e−iHt∆t|Ψt0〉 with ∆t = t− t0.
Budget constraint: invariance of Z = tr
[
e−βHt
]
.
Controls at each time: Ht, Tt, where Ht represents chosen Hamiltonian at time
t required to be self-adjoint, Tt represents temperature at time t (to pipe into
β of Z).
State: |Ψt〉
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t0 may be sent to asymptotic past inﬁnity, if we are interested in state vector evolution of
the entire system, not just a subsystem of subsystems that are eﬀectively modeled together
as residing in pure state vector.
4.7 Quantum mechanics reformulated
From aforementioned analysis, one can re-interpret quantum mechanic (including the theory
of theories) as follows:
Quantum mechanics is a set of procedures to learn state vector's evolution or
how world evolves. Given only knowledge of the law of state vector evolu-
tion, Schrödinger equation of invariant Hamiltonian, and partition function Z,
the principle of maximum entropy, now viewed as the solely consistent way of
doing inference, requires us to maximize entropy of an observer under these con-
straints. Initial conditions provided would be initial state vector and Z. This
is to be framed as an observer learning nature via renormalization.
Note that invariance of Hamiltonian for Schrödinger equation does not mean that Hamil-
tonian learned will be invariant across time.
In reality, Hamiltonian will be conserved in Schrödinger picture of quantum mechan-
ics. However, we do not know what this Hamiltonian is, and have to learn it. At each time,
given constraints, a diﬀerent Hamiltonian can be learned even when we take the constraint
that Hamiltonian is conserved across time.
4.8 AdS/CFT as a neural network
Recently, a paper[15] that casts AdS/CFT correspondence in terms of a deep Boltzmann
machine has appeared - which presents bulk as learning about boundary.
When we already know boundary exactly, then training can be done to ensure that
boundary is learned by bulk almost perfectly. The problem, if one takes an epistemic view
of quantum mechanics, is that we do not know boundary exactly. Thus, what we are to
train against becomes unclear. This question itself is not a problem of the cited paper, but
it needs to be asked here.
That is, the learning mechanism is missing to train the bulk from the boundary data.
That missing piece is of course the theory of theories explored before. Furthermore, this
Boltzmann machine picture gives another justiﬁcation into why partition function is kept
invariant, and how quantum mechanics relates to statistical mechanics and thermodynam-
ics.
4.9 Equivalence of subjective-objective, epistemic-ontic interpretations
So far, two main dividing lines of interpretations of quantum mechanics were stated:
subjective-objective and epistemic-ontic.
Having taken an epistemic view of quantum mechanics, there surely would have been
something weird. An observer is seen as a learner, yet quantum mechanics was said to be
objective. This of course is matter of semantics. We could say that observers have subjective
 9 
powers. But these powers are immediately crushed by inference consistency requirements.
After all, this is just objective Bayesianism patching on subjective Bayesianism. Thus, all
subjective interpretations can be made objective as long as inference consistency require-
ments constrain subjectivity signiﬁcantly, and there is not much value distinguishing the
two categories.
Epistemic interpretations can be made ontic as well. If epistemic interpretations are
about understanding quantum mechanics as recording state of knowledge of an observer,
instead of representing existing reality, then we could simply elevate state of knowledge of
an observer as reality.
This would not be possible if we only allow for a single universe. But we can allow for
multiverse. When observer Alice chooses a diﬀerent theory as being learned, we could say
that she moved from one universe to another, where universe is equated to a theory. Each
universe still carries time-invariant Hamiltonian.
Thus equivalence of epistemic, ontic, subjective and objective interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics, and we can use whatever interpretation is more convenient for explanations.
4.10 Theme: formulating quantum mechanics fully from Bayesian inference
requirements
The core theme of this writing is reformulating quantum mechanics fully from Bayesian
inference requirements. What remains to be tackled for this reformulation is: derivation of
Schrödinger equation, conservation of Hamiltonian (and partition function Z) and Born's
rule. If we get these three derived from Bayesian inference requirements, then quantum
mechanics is completely reformulated in terms of Bayesian inference.
Of course we do not really need to derive the three remaining postulates - we can simply
assume and move on. But as will be seen, there are values in deriving them.
General Schrödinger equation that accommodates Hamiltonians that are not conserved
over time is easily derived when unitarity of a state vector and linearity of quantum oper-
ators are assumed. And unitarity has to do with Born's rule. Thus, if Born's rule can be
derived from some Bayesian inference requirements, then unitarity assumption is justiﬁed.
Fortunately, the derivation has already been done by Sebens-Carroll (2018)[16]. One
important thing to note about the cited paper is that it is not actually restricted to Ev-
erettian, or many-worlds, interpretations of quantum mechanics despite the title. The
ESP principle (epistemic separability principle) used to derive Born's rule is inherently a
Bayesian inference principle that does not require references to many-worlds interpretation.
Thus, it can be used safely to complete formulation of quantum mechanics as a Bayesian
inference framework.
One may be curious as to why a more general form of Schrödinger equation is used,
instead of the more restricted one used for the optimization problem. But it is easy to
realize that this general form is valid as well, because we can map Hamiltonian H ′(t) used
in general Schrödinger equation to a set of time-invariant Hamiltonians Ht at each time t.
With this map, one can reformulate the optimization problem to use the more general form
of Schrödinger equation.
 10 
That still requires us to derive why Schrödinger equation has to be linear. Again,
fortunately, such considerations were already explored using information-theoretic and thus
Bayesian inference requirements[17]. In Parwani (2005), linearity of Schrödinger equation
comes from Lorentz invariance. But how could this be, when we know that theories that
violate Lorentz invariance exist? The extra ingredients, of course, are information-theoretic
and Bayesian inference considerations.
And if this approach to linearity of Schrödinger equation is correct, then we need to
answer why Lorentz invariance must be kept. For now, I would just stop here, but justifying
Lorentz invariance is going to be far easier than linearity.
Lastly, why time-invariant Hamiltonian must be used, despite learned Hamiltonians
may be diﬀerent oer time. We would like learning results of diﬀerent observers on a same
system to converge. But the results may only become same in asymptotic past and future
inﬁnity. Having justiﬁed the general form of Schrödinger equation, one can notice that the
additional requirement only makes sense when Hamiltonian is time-invariant. Talking of
time-varying Hamiltonian in asymptotic past and future inﬁnity is simply absurd - it means
there really is no convergence.
These asymptotic ﬁnal states (for an entire universe, not necessarily each subsystem)
are essentially thermal equilibrium states - thus justifying invariance of Z. This completes
full reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of Bayesian inference (or one may prefer
the word information theory).
Of course more substantiating and veriﬁcation works need to be done on proofs of
linearity of Schrödinger equation from inference or information-theoretic principles. But
for now at least, indications are good.
5 Quantum redundancy: spacetime from entanglement
5.1 Basis redundancy
It was recently argued (Czech et al. (2019)[18]) that spacetime arises from basis redundancy
requirements. The point is essentially what was argued in this writing - that physics should
work consistently with diﬀerent sets of subsystem basis. The paper echoes the mirror
operator idea of Papadodimas-Raju (2014)[6] as well.
That is, spacetime is sewing together essentially redundant descriptions. This re-
dundancy protection has limits, which the cited paper discusses with reference to error-
correcting code literature of holographic duality. Also, the basis selection issue would have
to be resolved by an additional clariﬁcation, which was provided in this writing.
5.2 Error-correcting code
We have seen the parallel between Hardy's paradox and the ﬁrewall paradox in subsection
2.3. One point to rethink here is the question of why in Hardy's paradox we do not see
a problem for quantum mechanics, but a problem seems to exist for the ﬁrewall paradox
despite the parallel.
This is where quantum error-correcting code vision[19] of holographic duality becomes
very useful. Basically, the idea is that in the ﬁrewall paradox, error correction breaks down
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such that two observers no longer arrive at the same bulk. But this does not render physics
inconsistent - because while error correction was protecting observers from bulk divergence,
in fully quantum side, discrepancies were there. Spacetime is thus expressed diﬀerently for
some sets of observers, but physics is still consistent.
5.3 Entanglement equilibrium
The key clue toward the form of the theory of theories idea comes from the entanglement
equilibrium literature. In essence, entanglement equilibrium is expressed by:
δS = δSUV + δSIR = 0
where S is an entropy of some subsystem. Usually, the UV-IR factored equilibrium relation
is emphasized instead of δS = 0, which is rendered useless if without factorization in the
literature. The entanglement equilibrium literature[20][21] diﬀers from the approach of this
writing in that this is considered solely an equilibrium behavior or holding only in ﬁrst-order
perturbation sense, which means we often only get linearized Einstein equations at the end,
which are powerful enough for many purposes.
For Jacobson (2016)[20], it can be understood why the generalization to the principle
of maximum entropy was not made, but then subsequent research lifted away many of
restrictions of Jacobson (2016). Despite the name entanglement equilibrium, how far this
is applicable has become blurred.
The generalization to the principle of maximum entropy of course seemed impossible.
How can multiple theories be describing our reality? Ideally, should not we start from one
theory and derive everything, with entanglement equilibrium only providing hints toward
the ultimate theory of everything?
It was this picture of the theory of everything this writing intended to shatter. Ac-
cepting the theory of theories idea, if not the form, it becomes clear that entanglement
equilibrium literature, generalized suﬃciently as in recent papers, provides a powerful evi-
dence that the form of the theory of theories - centering around the principle of maximum
entropy under constraints - is correct.
As stated in Cao-Carroll (2018)[21], the connection to error-correcting codes is there
when considering dividing entropy into two parts. Now the main problem with utilizing
error-correcting code understanding directly is that it is still AdS/CFT correspondence. Our
world is not AdS, and that limits applications. The boundary-less spacetime construction
is thus attempted in Cao-Carroll (2018)[21].
The major question, at this point, is really about how far applicable these results are.
And that is unclear. If the theory of theories idea in this writing is correct, and some of
spacetime-from-entanglement literature have general applicability far beyond AdS/CFT,
then the question of laws of quantum gravity would be ﬁnished today. Of course having
laws does not equate to full understanding of quantum gravity, as we would still have to
seek for an initial state vector that generates our spacetime, but we would know what we
must do to ﬁnish understanding of quantum physics.
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One can do something like Cao-Carroll (2018), but recent works[22] try to generalize
AdS/CFT correspondence into dS/dS correspondence[23]. This would allow us to generalize
what we have learned in AdS/CFT into examples involving our actual spacetime.
5.4 Quantum decoherence
The key point behind spacetime-from-entanglement literature is redundancy. Why do we
such a robust spacetime when quantum states seem so fragile? The answer is redundancy
allowing for error correction.
Somewhat amazingly, this emphasis on redundancy is shared by quantum decoherence
literature - see Zurek (1982)[24] - with a similar mechanism. But in quantum decoherence,
this redundancy would have to be formed, rather than being already there. Just as what
one can call a measurement arises after some quantum decoherence, one can say robust
spacetime shared by diﬀerent observers only arises after some redundancy formation has
successfully formed. This does not contradict error-correcting code literature of AdS/CFT,
and in fact should be expected. Quantum eﬀects to spacetime are supposed to be volatile,
and it is quantum decoherence that suppresses full eﬀects of volatility and superposition.
We can combine aforementioned parallels in spacetime-from-entanglement literature
into the following story: in machine learning, there are some series of error correction - or
simply called data processing - to get information wanted. One can map this sequence of
data processing to quantum decoherence over time as well. In this story, all aforementioned
redundancy ideas are equivalent, allowing recovery of robust spacetime.
In terms of renormalization, one can imagine a typical quantum experiment and mea-
surement/decoherence process as going from an initial ﬁxed point (which maps to an initial
Hamiltonian and state vector) that observers share to a ﬁnal ﬁxed point, which will not
be reached in ﬁnite time, but observers would come close to such a ﬁxed point quite fast,
allowing for error correction to the shared end result. Learning paths - thus theories used
between these ﬁxed points - can be diﬀerent depending an observer, and divergences can
be signiﬁcant. This is why it is hard to see quantum reality between measurements.
5.5 Evidences and clues for the theory of theories
Having created a case for equivalence of the ideas (neural network, basis redundancy, error-
correcting code, quantum decoherence), the glaring missing piece again is a universal learn-
ing mechanism. This need again provides another evidence for necessity of the theory of
theories explored in this writing.
Furthermore, entanglement equilibrium literature, which stands out from above equiv-
alence despite being part of spacetime-from-entanglement literature, provides a direct clue
for the form of the theory of theories.
We will also soon see the example in non-equilibrium classical thermodynamics that
points toward the theory of theories idea as well - see subsection 6.2.
Another clue concerns a quantum decoherence process resulting in a clear measurement
- the idea involves some entanglement that increases some entropy. Thus, why not go for
the principle of maximum entropy? This of course is an aesthetic argument and may not
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constitute a scientiﬁc argument. But there may be something to trust about aesthetics in
physics, given that physics in the past decades was motivated by beautiful symmetries.
6 Thermodynamics and Irreversibility
6.1 Do we have a secure foundation for thermodynamics?
This is somewhat the re-hash of subsection 4.5. The main question that thermodynamics
often faces is that all physical processes in quantum and classical physics are technically
reversible. An equilibrium state may naturally, without intervention, be reversed to a non-
equilibrium state.
Proofs that irreversibility of thermodynamics is compatible with fundamental laws
of classical or quantum physics have been provided - for now, I will focus on classical
thermodynamics, later introducing quantum aspects, following Swendsen (2008)[25].
The logic behind irreversibility is that even under deterministic laws of classical physics,
an observer only knows the system in question partially, requiring initial probabilistic dis-
tribution understanding of the system. If not interfered, ﬁnal equilibrium probabilistic
distribution, which is obtained with laws of classical physics, cannot be reversed in any
imaginable means.
This works whenever initial ignorance of an observer at initial time can never be mod-
iﬁed to obtain new probabilistic distributions over time. In practice, the above assumption
can be said to hold approximately well. So the use of thermodynamics is more than justiﬁed.
The problem is when thermodynamics is said to provide foundation for fundamental nature
of irreversibility and the arrow of time, no longer remaining as a useful approximation to
reality. But in quantum mechanics, initial ignorance has to change because observer Alice
herself (and thus Alice's records) can change due to laws of physics, echoing the point made
about quantum recoherence after quantum decoherence in subsection 4.5.
Thus a new law is required, if irreversibility is indeed fundamental, and theory of
theories presented in this writing exactly ﬁlls in that role, because entropy of an observer
would always be non-decreasing over time. This of course would matter only for those who
believe in irreversibility being fundamental part of nature, but for those do, this would
count as a signiﬁcant evidence for the theory of theories.
6.2 The law of maximum entropy production
In non-equilibrium classical thermodynamics, Swenson and others[26] proposed the law of
maximum entropy production (LMEP) as the fourth law of thermodynamics. The intuition,
as stated by Rod Swenson, behind LMEP is simple - let me quote directly from the cited
article:
As an example, R. Swenson considered further the change of the temperature
in a house in winter. If all doors and windows are closed, the street and room
temperatures equalize through heat conduction, i.e. relatively slowly. Open-
ing of a door or a window provides a new opportunity for equalization of the
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temperatures through the convective transfer. This mechanism will bring the
house-street system to the thermal equilibrium faster.
Traditional laws of equilibrium thermodynamics do not explain how equilibrium, or steady
state, is reached, and this fourth law ﬁlls this missing piece.
The principle of maximum entropy used in the theory of theories can be considered as
a proper quantum generalization of LMEP, which serves as another evidence for the theory
of theories.
6.3 Frauchinger-Renner thought experiment
But so far, we have not discussed why irreversibility matters so much. And that is left to the
Frauchiger-Renner (FR) thought experiment[1] to demonstrate. The details of the thought
experiment would have to be referred to the cited article, and I will focus on analysis.
First, that the FR thought experiment is useless because of quantum mechanics is
unitary is not really a good argument. It is like saying the ﬁrewall paradox should not even
be discussed because quantum mechanics is consistent. There is a value in understanding
how things really ﬁt into - sometimes revealing a need for something additional.
Second, while it is true that the part of the FR thought experiment is the Wigner's
friend thought experiment, to call it Hardy's paradox Wigner's friend-iﬁed would be a bit of
stretch. This is because two labs are not actually entangled - one spin is simply transported
via a quantum communication channel from one agent to another as to correlate results of
the labs. This is the real novelty behind the FR thought experiment.
Third, it is the interpretation of Wigner's friend part that is most controversial about
the FR thought experiment. A quantum state of Friend-plus-the-qubit-in-question (FQ)
that Wigner sees can be stated as:
|F0〉|0〉+ |F1〉1〉√
2
Suppose that Wigner's friend observed |0〉 for the qubit. Having this external knowledge,
we can say that Wigner will measure the combined system as |F0〉|0〉 certainly. Or is it?
That is, before Wigner measures anything, should we represent state vector of FQ after
the measurement of the qubit by Wigner's friend as |F0〉|0〉 (collapse) or the entire state
vector (no collapse)? If former, then there is no paradox. It is the latter case that is
complicated.
The traditional understanding of the no-collapse approach is that Wigner's probability
of observing |F0〉|0〉 is 1/2 regardless of the measurement done by Wigner's friend. The
measurement done by Wigner's friend is simply canceled as non-existent. But this is too
strong. And even if there was no collapse, possibility that Wigner's probability of observing
|F0〉|0〉 is 1 externally speaking still exists. In language of many-worlds interpretation, while
Wigner does not know that it is in the world branch involving |0〉, we do know that Wigner
is in the branch. And Wigner can recognize that this external view exists. And in many-
worlds interpretation, state vector never collapses.
From this alternative no-collapse view, the FR thought experiment comes to make
sense along with its paradoxical conclusion. If one does not want to abandon any one
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of semiclassical validity of quantum communication channel, non-collapse completeness of
quantum mechanics and eﬀective identity of the theory governing any subsystem involved
(or subsystems simply living in same Hilbert space), what one should give up instead is
reversibility.
By the spirit of strong complementarity, it seems that it would be better to deny eﬀec-
tive identity of the theory used by diﬀerent subsystems. But the FR thought experiment
is a low-energy experiment - thus the traditional way of thinking about quantum mechanics
would work ﬁne as well, subsystems well-approximately living in a shared Hilbert space,
with appropriate basis transformations.
In order to measure some result, quantum decoherence literature suggests that envi-
ronment, observer and measured subsystems are all required to be entangled. The environ-
ment part is what the FR thought experiment does not factor in. Thus, in order for the
FR thought experiment to work, each lab must be disentangled to return the state of the
lab into the original initial state vector. As said before, this does not mean that a previous
measurement outcome is canceled, and many-worlds interpretation is helpful in thinking
about this.
But can a lab really be reversed this way? The irreversibility result of the theory of
theories says no, thus saving quantum mechanics from paradoxical consequences.
The FR thought experiment therefore can be re-interpreted as demonstrating funda-
mental importance of irreversibility, providing another evidence for the theory of theories.
7 Strong complementarity as a requirement of the theory of theories
7.1 Broken invariance of observables?
One potential criticism of strong complementarity, as presented in this writing, is that
observables no longer stay invariant for an observer and covariant across diﬀerent observers.
Think of two diﬀerent theories, related by basis transformation (applied to theories instead
of basis). At t = 0, one can think of deriving an observable for one theory from the
physically same observable of another theory. However, if an observable of one theory
is time-invariant and correct, then an observable of another theory would not be time-
invariant. This is because two theories are related by a diﬀerent basis transformation at
each time.
This seems to be a strong problem, but it is not actually a problem. The point is
that an observer can be thought of as using each theory only once at maximum. Thus,
observable attached to a theory is well-deﬁned as far as a reference is clear.
In initial and ﬁnal state theories, we expect observers agreeing on observations. Ob-
servables on those theories must be time-invariant, and there is no problem imposing this.
Essentially, what was explored before is basically a mirror operator idea in [6]. It is just
that the idea was massively simpliﬁed for the purpose of this writing and cleaner analysis
of potential objections. We now see a simple objection that can immediately arise and how
this is resolved.
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7.2 Satisfaction of postulates of black hole complementarity
Postulates of black hole complementarity[27] go as follow:
• Unitarity (purity) of quantum physics
• No drama: an infalling observer (Alice) crossing the horizon of a black hole notices
nothing special. Thus usual spacetime for Alice.
• Eﬀective ﬁeld theory holds outside the horizon.
• Equality of Bekenstein-Hawking entropy with von Neumann entropy of a black hole,
suitably deﬁned.
The real question is whether the theory of theories satisﬁes the second postulate (no drama),
because other postulates were already dealt in this writing. The AMPS paradox was that
we should give up no drama, because two incompatible descriptions can be simultaneously
accessed. But the theory of theories can be used to the AMPS account of a black hole
in that Alice transitions to a new theory that invalidates entanglement relations of an old
theory. Otherwise, the AMPS account remains the same - thus all postulates of black hole
complementarity are satisﬁed.
8 Transition probability arithmetic: resolving the measurement problem
completely
Moving from some outcome of a theory to a semi-outcome of another theory
Because diﬀerent theories are dealt together instead of a single theory, it must be possible
to map outcome |k〉 at time t of one theory to some vector |m〉 in another theory at time t.
The idea is simple. Recall that in this writing, moving from one theory (Hamiltonian
H) to another theory (Hamiltonian V ) is thought as basis transformation. The relevant
transformation factor is Q = e−iV teiHt, where it is assumed that all theories share an initial
state vector at t = 0.
|m〉 = Q|k〉 (8.1)
|k〉 is a semi-outcome vector that may not be an outcome vector, as it is a weighted super-
position of outcome vectors.
The starting system of probability equations Transition probability arithmetic starts
from the system of probability equations, reﬂecting transition, that must hold:
P0(x1)Pu(x1 → y1) + · · ·+ P0(xn)Pu(xn → y1) = Pt1(y1)
...
P0(x1)Pu(x1 → yn) + · · ·+ P0(xn)Pu(xn → yn) = Pt1(xn)
(8.2)
where Pt(x1) refers to probability of semi-outcome x1 at time t = 0, t1, t1 → 0 but t1 > 0,
and Pu(xi → yj) represents transition probability from semi-outcome xi at t = 0 to outcome
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yj at t = t1. (Notice the restriction of yj to an outcome.) Subscript u refers to undetermined
status of transition probabilities, and we derive P0 and Pt1 from a given state vector by
Born rule. A state vector is assumed to be n-dimensional, but the conclusion obtained can
be generalized to inﬁnite dimension as well. Semi-outcomes satisfy 〈yi|yj〉 = δij .
P0 and P1 are probability vectors, and this means that Pu is a stochastic matrix with∑
j Pu(xi → xj) = 1. Thus this consistency requirement does not have to be imposed. All
that is to be ensured additionally is non-negativity of transition probability.
Note that the above system of equation satisﬁes objective completeness of quantum
mechanics and unitary evolution.
The requirement of transition probability arithmetic A law of transition probabil-
ity has to satisfy Pu(xi → yj) = |〈yj |e−iHt1 |xi〉|2 if P0(xi) = 1. This reﬂects the traditional
collapse and measurement intuition.
The ratio rule There are n2 unknown transition probabilities and n equations in Equa-
tion 8.2. Thus n2 − n equations need to be provided to determine transition probabilities.
The ratio rule is speciﬁed as:
Pu(x1 → y1) : Pu(x2 → y1) = |Am(x1 → y1)|2 : |Am(x2 → y1)|2
Pu(x1 → y1) : Pu(x3 → y1) = |Am(x1 → y1)|2 : |Am(x3 → y1)|2
...
Pu(x1 → y1) : Pu(xn → y1) = |Am(x1 → y1)|2 : |Am(xn → y1)|2
...
Pu(x1 → yn) : Pu(x2 → yn) = |Am(x1 → yn)|2 : |Am(x2 → yn)|2
...
Pu(x1 → yn) : Pu(xn → yn) = |Am(x1 → yn)|2 : |Am(xn → yn)|2
(8.3)
where Am(xi → yj) = 〈yj |e−iHt1 |xi〉 refers to transition amplitude from semi-outcome xi
at t = 0 to outcome yj at t = t1. This gives us additional n
2 − n equations needed, and
satisﬁes the requirement. Non-negativity of transition probability is guaranteed as well.
9 Conclusion
Let me present the contents of this writing in a diﬀerent order.
Transition probability arithmetic (TPA) Even without the collapse postulate, it
makes sense to talk of transition probability of one outcome |xi〉 of a state vector at time t
to |xj〉 of a state vector at time t′ > t.
Quantum decoherence It provides a mechanism of how coherence between outcomes in
a state vector can be lost such that each outcome can be considered completely separated
from other outcomes. However, it still does not resolve basis ambiguity, despite providing
some clues toward resolving it.
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TPA+quantum decoherence Together, they provide a story on why it is possible to do
quantum mechanics both on an entire system and its individual subsystems, without wor-
rying about incompatibility of results, even when the collapse postulate is eliminated. After
signiﬁcant decoherence, understood to happen very quickly, eﬀects of coherence on transi-
tion probability, given by TPA, become very close to zero. Thus all traditional quantum
calculations are still consistent.
Elimination of subjectivity and omniscience While the Bayesian update interpre-
tation of collapse can make sense, it is problematic in that an observer is left not modeled
by physics. TPA+quantum decoherence eliminate subjectivity, with exception of basis am-
biguity. The ﬁrewall paradox, analyzed by parallels with Hardy's paradox, demonstrates
why basis ambiguity, combined with a subjectivist interpretation of quantum mechanics,
can be very problematic. Thus for basis ambiguity, we also want to eliminate aspects of
subjectivity.
Epistemic understanding of quantum mechanics (QM) For convenience, an epis-
temic interpretation of quantum mechanics is used. That is, a state vector in QM describes
state of knowledge of a system. This interpretation makes it readily available to objective
Bayesian inference tools.
QM from (objective) Bayesian inference consistency The point is that given an
initial state vector and partition function constant Z, there is complete uncertainty as to
how physical states would evolve, except constraints of invariance of Z - basically conserva-
tion of sum of probability - and Schrödinger equation of conserved Hamiltonian, which are
reinterpreted as coming out of inference consistency requirements. The Born rule is also
understood as a consequence of Bayesian inference consistency requirements.
The principle of maximum entropy of an observer rules in this complete uncertainty
circumstance, as consistency axioms in objective Bayesian inference literature dictate. This
is because this is essentially equivalent to setting a prior probability. An observer can only
know outside by variations on her own states - thus entropy of an observer is the focus.
Hamiltonians that are learned can diﬀer over time, despite the Hamiltonian of a system
assumed to be conserved over time. Thus consistent Bayesian inference generates the theory
of theories. An observer is eﬀectively forced by objective Bayesianism to use a diﬀerent
description of the world over time in some circumstances. In fact, it is what drives examples
like black hole complementarity, despite reality actually being same for any observer.
The standard collapse interpretation is readily accommodated in this re-interpretation
of qauntum mechanics: it is about resetting an initial state vector and Z. Then inference is
carried out until an observer gets to measure a subsystem, treated eﬀectively as collapse of
a quantum state. Post-measurement, the observer again resets initial conditions and so on.
This, however, only works as an eﬀective description - eventually, one has to worry about
potential recoherence. Thus, completely accurate and objective Bayesian inference requires
us not to reset the initial state vector of an entire system.
Understandably, this sounds paradoxical. Why can we not just use a ﬁnal ﬁxed point
theory at every time? That is the theory that every observer is supposed to agree on. But
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again, we really do not know whether this ﬁnal ﬁxed point theory really is actual theory of
reality. That learning converged does not mean it is the right one. But it does not matter,
because every observer shares the same view of the world! I will revisit this issue when I
discuss thermodynamics again.
Elimination of basis selection By this point, it would be clear that basis ﬂexibility can
safely be eliminated - a basis is ﬁxed. Traditional basis transformation is translated to be
theory transformation. This leads to a complaint that an observable is not invariant, which
I mainly address by resorting to initial and end (not necessarily thermal) equilibrium
theories, or ﬁxed points in renormalization group terminology, and deﬁning observables on
them. But quantum mechanics is already a relativist theory, so this should not come as
much of a surprise. In fact, observables can be replaced by relative understanding in a
quantum state. This is just an abridged version of Papadodimas-Raju mirror operators.
Thermodynamics view While I initially rejected Swendsen's justiﬁcation for a solid
foundation of thermodynamics, eventually the view is, at core, correct. Recoherence is
not completely eliminated but heavily restricted because of the principle of maximum en-
tropy. It is ignorance of the entire system that drives thermodynamics and irreversibility.
The Frauchinger-Renner thought experiment requires irreversibility to eliminate a paradox,
providing an evidence for necessity of the Bayesian reformulation of quantum mechanics.
Non-equilibrium thermodynamics also supports the reformulation as well, but this is largely
because the law of maximum entropy was already demonstrated to be powerful even without
objective Bayesian foundations from consistency requirements.
The main key point of Swendsen's argument is that there can be many compatible
probabilistic distributions for a system given - after all, it is just about ignorance! An
underlying system is deterministic there anyway too. Transporting this into QM, it is now
possible that ﬁnal ﬁxed point theories are not actually equivalent to a theory governing
reality. But again, it does not matter, just as classical thermodynamics and classical physics
work simultaneously.
Quantum gravity and spacetime It is often said that we are far away from an oper-
ational quantum theory of gravity consistent with reality. We may actually be far closer -
in fact we may have completed one without us knowing for sure. Even so, identifying an
initial asymptotic state of the entire universe, which is required to start inference of theories
governing the universe, is a diﬃcult job, and we may still be left without an actual form of
the theory of everything. We know laws that govern our universe but not theories.
In section 5, spacetime-from-entanglement literature is shown to provide evidences for
the reformulation of quantum mechanics. Here, I will not discuss details again, as they are
not at this point important.
Future works This work provides how QM may be linked to questions of cosmology. So
it seems natural to port knowledge in cosmology (or more generally astrophysics) back to
QM with hopes of extracting the right inferred theory out of obtained initial conditions,
mostly coming directly out of observations.
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New cross-ﬁeld works previously unimaginable are made possible by this reformulation
of QM, and a new exciting chapter of physics is in front of us.
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